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Abstract 
In the wake of post-hermeneutic refusals of interpretation in recent continental 
philosophy, this essay returns to Schelling as a means of understanding what such a 
renewed reading practice of philosophical fundamentalism might look like. I argue 
that recent impetus for a Schellingian conception of literalism can be found in Grant’s 
attack on the metaphorising tendencies of previous Schelling scholarship, and the 
ground for such literalism is to be located in the concept of tautegory that Schelling 
proposes in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology. Schelling is a philosopher 
of form, and the form of the word remains as inviolable as any other natural form. 
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1. 
The post-hermeneutic era in continental philosophy is grounded in a refusal to accept 
the vocation of the philosopher as interpreter, passing on old texts while uncovering 
new meanings.
1
 Many philosophers in the continental tradition now see themselves 
embarking on a constructive, speculative voyage into the new.
2
 In this essay, I 
contend that this post-hermeneutic age is to be defined by a renewed literalism. It is a 
Schellingian age in which one must read tautegorically.  
This is an argument that ultimately concerns difference and repetition – 
specifically, the various modalities of difference and repetition at play in critical re-
readings of philosophy. At the centre of this essay is an interrogation of the 
hermeneutic contention that “we understand in a different way, if we understand at 
all”3, and the prejudice this exposes, widespread in philosophy, for the disposability 
and mutability of form. Philosophers tend to read esoterically, revealing content at the 
expense of form; Schelling, however, is first and foremost a philosopher of form
4
, and 
so I ask, following Schelling: what would philosophy become if it were grounded on a 
reading practice that repeated, rather than interpreted or translated forms? In other 
words, what would a philosophical fundamentalism look like? 
In what follows, I argue that one of the most significant achievements of Iain 
Hamilton Grant’s Philosophies of Nature after Schelling was to recover an obligation 
to take Schelling at his word – to read, that is, his Naturphilosophie not as metaphor 
                                                 
1
 See Alain Badiou, Theoretical Writings, ed. and trans. Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 22-40. 
2
 See Levi Bryant, Graham Harman and Nick Srnicek, “Towards a Speculative Philosophy” in Bryant, 
Harman and Srnicek (eds), The Speculative Turn: Continental Realism and Materialism (Melbourne: 
re:press, 2011), 1. 
3
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 296. 
4
 On Schelling as a philosopher of form, see Bruce Matthews, Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy 
(Albany: SUNY, 2011) and Daniel Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language: Forming the 
System of Identity (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 226-8. 
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but according to its very letter. And such an obligation is, I further contend, itself 
thoroughly Schellingian: it is Schelling who in his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Mythology sets out a mode of reading, based on the concept of tautegory, that remains 
resolutely literalistic. 
 
 
2. 
There are three contexts at stake in what follows. First, there is the matter of 
understanding Schellingian metaphilosophy, particularly the conceptions of writing 
and reading that are to be self-referentially applied to Schelling’s own texts. 
Compared with Fichte, Maimon and Hegel who like nothing better than to discuss 
their own philosophical practice, Schelling is often reticent about metaphilosophical 
themes in general. And there are good philosophical reasons for his refusal to “go 
meta”: his commitment to immanence is thoroughgoing, hence a transcendent (or 
even transcendental) viewpoint over one’s own methodological presuppositions and 
practices is illegitimate.
5
 Nevertheless, there are, I contend, moments in his oeuvre 
where his metaphilosophical and writerly practices are manifest. Two such passages 
are his construction of symbolic language between 1802 and 1804 and his discussion 
of tautegory in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology. The two passages are of 
course linked, since tautegory (or the inherence of meaning in being) is a major 
component of Schelling’s definition of the symbol as well.6 Indeed, the literalism 
directly consequent on his late discussion of tautegorical myth equally results from his 
construction of symbolic language. Schelling’s commitment to literalism is central to 
his metaphilosophy. 
                                                 
5
 I argue for this reading of Schellingian metaphilosophy at length in Daniel Whistler, “Schelling’s 
Poetry” in Clio 43.2 (2014). 
6
 See Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language, 37-40. 
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 Secondly, as will become clear during the second half of the essay, much of 
my argument will ultimately rest on the relation between the late and early Schelling – 
that is, on the extent to which the metaphysical tenets that Schelling first presents in 
his early Naturphilosophie and Identitätssystem (particularly in the 1801 
Presentation) hold true after 1809, even into the 1840s. The wager I make is that 
reading Schelling’s late philosophy through the prism of his early metaphysics – 
especially the doctrine of quantitative differentiation – is a productive exercise that 
sheds light on his recourse to tautegory. Indeed, this is, I am contending, a strategy 
faithful to both Schelling’s own self-understanding and to the increasingly popular 
“continuity thesis” in Schelling scholarship.7 
 Finally, this essay forms part of a larger project that interrogates the idea of a 
Naturphilosophie of language as it is both implicitly and explicitly put forward in 
Schelling’s works. What are the consequences, that is, of treating words like rocks or 
philosophical texts in continuity with animal bodies? In previous essays
8
, following 
Schelling’s own claims that there are “homologous language formations like there are 
mountain formations” and that therefore one must “cognise the physical in 
language”9, I have argued that Schellingian texts do need to be conceived as part of 
nature, and that only a rich or, in fact, maximal naturalism is able to achieve this.
10
 A 
dynamics of language is an integral, if regional domain of Naturphilosophie. In what 
follows, my implicit concern is the reception and interpretation of these rock-like 
                                                 
7
 A particularly compelling argument for the continuity thesis is provided by Iain Hamilton Grant in 
Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (London: Continuum, 2006), 14-21. 
8
 See Joshua Ramey and Daniel Whistler, “The Physics of Sense: Bruno, Schelling, Deleuze” in 
Edward Kazarian et al (eds), The Metaphysics of Gilles Deleuze (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 2014), 
87-109; Daniel Whistler, “Language after Philosophy of Nature: Schelling’s Geology of Divine 
Names” in Anthony Paul Smith and Daniel Whistler (eds), After the Postsecular and the Postmodern: 
New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2010), 335-
59; Daniel Whistler, “Improper Names for God: Religious Language and the ‘Spinoza Effect’” in 
Speculations 3 (2012), 99-134. 
9
 F.W.J. Schelling, Werke, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856), vol. 8, 453. 
10
 C.f. Grant’s extensity test (Philosophies of Nature, 19-21). 
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signifiers. What reading practices are appropriate or even feasible for a text that is 
fully and literally part of nature? What might a dynamics of reading look like? 
 
 
3. 
“The whole of modern philosophy since its inception through Descartes,” Schelling 
famously writes, “has this common deficiency – that nature does not exist for it and 
that it lacks a living basis.”11 And my aim in the first half of this essay is to draw 
attention to Grant’s contention that this neglect of nature identified by Schelling 
potentiates itself in post-Schellingian philosophy and particularly within Schelling 
scholarship itself. Moreover, I argue that what is partly at stake here is a problem of 
misreading, a failure to take seriously the words Schelling actually wrote. 
 Grant’s Philosophies of Nature after Schelling is so useful for my purposes 
because it is not merely an interpretation of Schelling, but also to be positioned in line 
with recent speculative trends in philosophy. That is, Grant writes, “The basic thing I 
want to talk about is the philosophical problem of nature, and I think this is a 
springboard for speculation.”12 Through Schelling, Grant hopes to “expose a 
materialist current… that has remained more or less beyond the range of Anglophone 
thinking”.13 He wagers that it is only by foregrounding, as Schelling did, “the eternal 
and necessary bond between philosophy and physics”14, that speculation becomes 
possible. 
                                                 
11
 Schelling, Werke, 7:356; Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, trans. James 
Gutmann (La Salle: Open Court, 1936), 30. 
12
 Grant in Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux, “Speculative 
Realism” in Collapse III (2007), 334. 
13
 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Schellingianism and Postmodernity: Towards a Materialist Naturphilosophie” 
(1998). Available at: www.bu.edu/wcp/papers/cult/cultgran.htm; last accessed: 01/04/2010. 
14
 Schelling, Werke, 7:101. 
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 And what has impeded contemporary philosophy from practising its own 
Naturphilosophie is precisely that obstacle Schelling himself points to in the quotation 
above: the “common deficiency” of all philosophies since Descartes to forget nature. 
In Grant’s words, “The enemy [of Naturphilosophie] is all post-Cartesian European 
philosophy’s elimination of the concept, even the existence, of nature.”15 Or, more 
precisely, this elimination consists in turning nature into one more “reducibly local 
problem-field” of philosophy16, rather than an orienting, fundamental concept. Nature 
is relegated to a merely regional aspect of philosophy’s more fundamental project, 
usually conceived in ethical or practical terms. The ethicisation of nature ends up 
obscuring it. In this vein, Schelling never stops attacking “the prioritisation of the 
practical over the physical.”17 For example, he attacks Fichtean “nature-cide”18 thus, 
 
[Fichtean philosophy] consists of nothing but a moralizing of the entire world 
that undermines life and hollows it out; a true disgust towards all nature and 
vitality except that in the subject.
19
 
 
This nature-cide can also be located, Grant goes on to argue, in post-Schellingian 
philosophers too: there remains an “essentially Fichtean solution to the metaphysics 
of nature underwriting the predominant trajectories of contemporary philosophy.”20 
And it is precisely “against [this] ‘ethical vision of the world’ that has, in the name of 
                                                 
15
 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, x. 
16
 Ibid, ix. 
17
 Iain Hamilton Grant, “The ‘Eternal and Necessary Bond Between Philosophy and Physics’: A 
Repetition of the Difference Between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy” in 
Angelaki 10.1 (2005), 51. 
18
 Ibid, 45. 
19
 Schelling, Werke, 7:19; translated in Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 61. 
20
 Grant, “The Eternal and Necessary Bond”, 44. 
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metaphysics, supplanted nature” that “the entire naturephilosophical programme” is to 
be directed.
21
  
Moreover, Grant sees the very same obscuration of the concept of nature, and 
so the very same betrayal of Naturphilosophie, taking place within Schelling 
scholarship itself. He speaks of Schelling scholarship as “Fichteanism masquerading 
as Schellingianism”.22 For Grant, this is most obvious in the perennial treatment of 
Schelling as a philosopher of freedom, a treatment that thereby subsumes the concept 
of nature to the practical domain, just as Fichte did. Nature becomes merely “the 
residuum of freedom”.23 Heidegger’s treatise on the Freiheitsschrift provides a clear 
example: “What Schelling calls ‘philosophy of nature,’ does not merely and not 
primarily mean the treatment of a special area ‘nature’, but means the understanding 
of nature in terms of the principle of Idealism, that is, in terms of freedom.”24 
Heidegger distinctly performs precisely the Fichtean move described above: he 
refuses to confront nature, instead diluting, diverting and translating it so that it is 
subsumed by freedom. The scandal of Naturphilosophie is thereby lost. 
One of the most important consequences of Grant’s work is therefore its 
insistence upon preserving the scandal of Naturphilosophie against such dilution. A 
case in point is the following well-worn passage from the Freiheitsschrift: 
 
Nothing can be achieved at all by such attenuated conceptions of God [that] 
separate God as far as possible from all of nature… Idealism, if it is not 
                                                 
21
 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 170-1. 
22
 Grant, “The Eternal and Necessary Bond”, 52. 
23
 Ibid, 46. 
24
 Martin Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(Athens OH: Ohio University Press, 1985), 94. 
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grounded in a vital realism will become just as empty and attenuated a system 
as the Leibnizean, Spinozistic or any other dogmatic philosophy.
25
 
 
In the wake of Grant’s work, it is flagrantly obvious that Schelling is here insisting 
that his philosophy of religion – indeed, his entire philosophy of the ideal world, 
including his theory of freedom – is grounded directly in his Naturphilosophie. Nature 
takes on explanatory priority. As Schelling goes on to say, the doctrine of God “could 
only be developed from the fundamental principles of a genuine philosophy of 
nature”.26 Nevertheless, who, before Grant, took this seriously? It is quite startling 
how, prior to the publication of Philosophies of Nature after Schelling in 2004, how 
few Schelling scholars had paid any serious attention to what is right in front of our 
noses: that the Freiheitsschrift is an exercise in Naturphilosophie. What Grant has 
done is to restore the scandal that all philosophy invested in the primacy of the 
practical must feel on reading Schelling’s texts. In other words, Grant makes us 
exclaim as Eschenmayer once did, 
 
[Schelling’s] essay on human freedom seems to me a complete 
transformation of ethics into physics, a consumption of the free by the 
necessary… of the moral by the natural, and above all a complete 
depotentiation of the higher into the lower order of things.
27
 
 
 
4. 
                                                 
25
 Schelling, Werke, 7:256; Investigations, 30. 
26
 Ibid, 259; 32. 
27
 Schelling, Werke, 8:150; translated in Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 202. 
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My question runs as follows, how did it come about that Schelling’s readers have 
managed time and time again to miss what is so evident in his texts? That is, how 
have these readers managed to so successfully ignore nature? This is a matter (among 
other things) of reading practices: a refusal to read Schelling at his word, a refusal to 
countenance what is most evident in his texts. Instead, readers of Schelling cultivate a 
perennial blindness to their very “material”, thereby transforming him from a 
philosopher of nature into a philosopher of freedom. What Schelling has suffered 
from more than most, I contend, is the metaphoricisation, translation and generally 
violent interpretation of his texts. The integrity of the Schellingian text is almost 
always given short shrift. Or to make this point in a slightly different way: 
hermeneutic strategies focusing on the margins, blind-spots and metaphors of his text 
continually function as defence-mechanisms to ward off nature, offering protection 
from the scandal of Naturphilosophie. One cultivates margins in order to avoid facing 
up to the obvious. 
For example, in the decade leading up to the publication of Grant’s book, post-
Derridean articles on the Freiheitsschrift appeared by David Farrell Krell and David 
L. Clark, among others, which treated Schelling’s text as a set of metaphors: when 
Schelling speaks of nature, he means to speak of différance or alterity.
28
 This 
hermeneutical principle was formalised in exemplary fashion in Kyriaki Goudeli’s 
Challenges to German Idealism in 2002. Goudeli listens to “the oracular language of 
the unconscious as it presents itself in [Schelling’s works through] nebulous dreams, 
                                                 
28
 See, for instance, David Farrell Krell, “The Crisis of Reason in the Nineteenth Century: Schelling's 
Treatise on Human Freedom” in  John Sallis et al (eds), The Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First 
Ten Years (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988); David L. Clark, “‘The Necessary Heritage of Darkness’: Tropics 
of Negativity in Schelling, Derrida, and de Man” in Tilottama Rajan and David L. Clark (eds), 
Intersections: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy and Contemporary Theory (Albany: SUNY, 1995); 
David L. Clark, “Heidegger's Craving: Being-on-Schelling” in Diacritics 27.3 (1997); David L. Clark, 
“Mourning Becomes Theory: Schelling and the Absent Body of Philosophy” in Schelling and 
Romanticism: Romantic Circles Praxis Series 16 
(http://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/schelling/clark/clark.html; last accessed: 30/12/2013). 
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elusive fantasies, morbid symptoms, unheard voices, speaking images, puzzling 
symbols.”29 This is a paradigmatic example of a critical evasion of what Schelling is 
saying: the truth of his writings exceeds his conscious philosophical capabilities. 
There is a Hegelianism to this reading practice, I want to argue – that is, this appeal to 
the unconscious truth of Schelling’s philosophy is an old trope often trotted out by 
Hegelians gone-by: from Engels (“Only this is certain, that it was Hegel who made 
Schelling aware of how far he had, without realising it, gone beyond Fichte”30) to 
Lukàcs (Hegel “rendered Schelling’s own discoveries… philosophically conscious to 
him”31). 
It is of course true that the attitudes of Goudeli, Krell and others emerge out of 
other concerns and interests than reading Schelling per se. Nevertheless, I want to 
argue that these attitudes are particularly unfortunate when it comes to reading 
Schelling for three reasons. First, as intimated, a reading practice that privileges the 
unconscious truths of Schelling’s philosophy over its textual appearance has 
historically been deployed as a weapon to minimise his contribution to the history of 
philosophy, in the name of Hegelian ascendancy. Reading Schelling marginally, or 
even just translating him into a more contemporary idiom, is to repeat this Hegelian 
gesture. It is to read Schelling otherwise – to read him allegorically, as I will go on to 
argue. A second problem with reading Schelling otherwise returns us back to Grant’s 
criticisms of Schelling scholarship. To translate or make Schelling’s philosophy 
metaphorical domesticates it, because it avoids that scandal of Schellingianism, 
nature. Only a literal reading can retain Schelling’s challenge to the mainstream 
privilege accorded to the practical and so preserve his rebellion against the common 
                                                 
29
 Kyriaki Goudeli, Challenges to German Idealism: Schelling, Fichte and Kant (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), 163. 
30
 Quoted in Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1975), 241. 
31
 Georg Lukács, The Destruction of Reason, trans. Peter Palmer (London: Merlin, 1980), 134-5. 
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deficiency of all philosophies since Descartes. Finally – and this forms the subject 
matter for the second half of the essay – reading Schelling “otherwise” is an anti-
Schellingian reading practice, for Schelling himself puts forward a reading strategy of 
pure literalism that opposes all attempts to translate the text, transpose it into 
metaphors or indeed enact any form of hermeneutic interpretation whatsoever. This 
reading practice – based on the concept of tautegory – gives rise to a philosophical 
fundamentalism. 
 
 
5. 
This practice of literalism is proposed in the Berlin lectures on the Historical-Critical 
Introduction to the Philosophy of the Mythology, a late lecture series which at its core 
consists in a series of reflections on the art of reading. Here, Schelling sets himself the 
task of “gain[ing] objectivity for mythological reproductions”.32 Previously, he 
argues, myths have been read either as pleasing poems or as accessible ways of 
imparting information; the task, then, is to read mythology in a way that exceeds its 
significance for the subject, that exceeds its correlative existence as merely for-
consciousness. The task is to find an objective meaning in myth, so as to get at 
mythology in itself. “[My] explanation,” Schelling claims, “fully breaks through into 
the objective realm” (207; 144), and so “unlocks a new world and cannot fail to 
expand human thinking and knowing.” (229; 175) 
At the end of the eighth lecture, Schelling introduces the central explanatory 
concept for reading myth in this objective way, tautegory: 
 
                                                 
32
 Schelling, Werke, 11:202; F.W.J. Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Mythology, trans. Mason Richey and Markus Zisselsberger (Albany: SUNY, 2007), 141. Within this 
section, citations to this work are made parenthetically without reference. 
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Mythology emerges immediately as such and in no other sense than in which 
it articulates itself…. Everything in it is thus to be understood as mythology 
expresses it, not as if something else were thought, something else said. 
Mythology is not allegorical; it is tautegorical. To mythology the gods are 
actually existing essences, gods that are not something else, do not mean 
something else, but rather mean only what they are. (195-6; 136) 
 
Tautegory is opposed to allegory.
33
 The latter violates the letter of a text for the sake 
of a hidden meaning; it is as if “something else [is] said” which the form of 
presentation distorts or disguises (195; 136).  Hence, in allegory, esoteric meaning is 
attained at the expense of an “improper and inauthentic sense”, “by removing the false 
historical garb” (9; 11). Schelling describes the allegorical viewpoint as follows, 
 
There is truth in mythology, but not in mythology as such. The mythological 
is: (1) either a mere form, disguise of (a) a historic truth, (b) of a physical 
truth; or (2) a misunderstanding, distortion, (a) of a purely scientific 
(essentially irreligious) truth, (b) of a religious truth. (214; 149) 
 
According to allegory therefore, the form is a “cloaked form of wording” (33; 27) 
which conceals what is really crucial, the content. Allegory is premised on a 
discrepancy between form and content in myth, where the form is considered the 
disposable element. In Gabriel’s words,  
                                                 
33
 The term “tautegory” had been coined by Coleridge (“On the Prometheus of Aeschylus” in Literary 
Remains, vol 2, ed. H.N. Coleridge (London: Pickering, 1839), 296) as a means of describing 
principles in Schelling’s earlier work. Schelling’s literal repetition of the term in his late lectures is 
therefore a prime example of his own practice of tautegorical interpretation: form is repeated and thus 
potentiated. (A very similar process occurs with respect to the term “symbol” as well, which Schelling 
literally repeats from A.W. Schlegel’s summary of the System of Transcendental Idealism, see 
Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language, 13-4.) In a footnote to the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Mythology (196; 187), Schelling goes on to acknowledge Coleridge’s coining of 
“tautegory” and defend him against charges of plagiarism or, as one might put it, Coleridge’s own 
tautegorical reading practices. 
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All explanations of mythology which impute to it another meaning... all 
explanations which assert that myths can be read through or translated into 
conceptual structures, are now to be called “allegorical”, since they assume 
that the words of mythos mean something other than they say… All theories 
of mythology which subject myths to an interpretation which presupposes a 
difference between form and content are allegorical: this is the dominant 
mode of thinking about mythology.
34
 
 
Philosophically, Schelling associates allegory with the neoplatonists and Hegel.
35
 
Hegel translates the content of mythology out of its primitive form; he re-presents it 
logically. As such, his reading practice is thoroughly allegorical. We have, of course, 
already encountered this Hegelian reading style applied to Schelling himself: Goudeli, 
for example, is an esoteric and therefore Hegelian reader of Schelling, uncovering a 
hidden content that needs to be liberated from its form. 
Schelling, on the other hand, rejects allegory in the name of tautegory. To 
quote Gabriel once more, 
 
Schelling objects that any allegorical interpretation that attempts to translate 
mythology into a different language thereby misses the point of the 
mythological forms of expression. Myths are not faulty efforts at expressing a 
logical truth, they rather enact the very unity of sense and being, of content 
and form.
36
 
 
                                                 
34
 Markus Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), 252; Markus Gabriel, “The 
Mythological Being of Reflection: An Essay on Hegel, Schelling and the Contingency of Necessity” in 
Gabriel and Slavoj Žižek, Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism 
(London: Continuum, 2009), 61. 
35
 See Gabriel, Der Mensch im Mythos, 252-4; “The Mythological Being of Reflection”, 61-2. 
36
 Gabriel, “The Mythological Being of Reflection”, 62. 
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Tautegorical reading respects the inviolability of the original form and so repeats that 
form too. In Schelling’s own words, 
 
Form and content, matter and outer appearance cannot be differentiated in 
[myth]. The ideas are not first present in another form, but rather only emerge 
in, and thus also at the same time with, this form. (195; 136) 
 
The original form of mythology is the only form for mythology; any translation or 
alteration is falsification. Adequate interpretations need not only to respect and repeat 
content but also form. Hence, “The form appears as necessary” (221; 193); as Gabriel 
glosses, Schelling here attains “insight into the necessity of a form... Whereas Hegel 
tried to uncover the necessity of the content of mythology, Schelling insists on the 
necessity of the form of representation which cannot be sidestepped.”37 
Moreover, such inviolability of form is synonymous with an absolute 
literalism in interpretation. Hence, Schelling continues immediately after introducing 
the concept of tautegory, 
 
In order to take on a comprehensible and graspable meaning, the 
emasculation of Uranus, the regicide of Kronos, and the other countless acts 
and events of the history of the gods require nothing other than to be 
understood literally. (198; 137; my emphasis) 
 
Myths must be understood literally, be taken at their word, and this is because their 
form is as inviolable as their content. All that adequate philosophy of mythology is 
                                                 
37
 Gabriel, “The Mythological Being of Reflection”, 62. 
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able to achieve, therefore, is a literal repetition of myth in philosophical discourse. 
Tautegory, I contend, leads immediately to a hyperbolic literalism. 
 
 
6. 
However, tautegory is only a relevant criterion for assessing the value of Schelling 
scholarship and philosophical practice in general, if it can be seen to apply 
legitimately to interpretations of philosophy as well as myth. This is a contentious 
claim: Schelling at no point explicitly makes this claim and prima facie it seems 
plausible that the opposite is the case – that is, interpretations of philosophical logoi 
obey very different laws to interpretations of mythoi. It is necessary to show, then, 
that there is good reason to apply tautegory to philosophical discourse, rather than just 
to mythological discourse, i.e. that tautegorical reading exemplifies Schelling’s 
conception of all philosophical understanding.  
The ground for such a claim is to be found in the Schellingian doctrine of 
potentiation (or repetition with intensification). Just as philosophy of nature repeats 
nature and philosophy of history repeats history, so too philosophy of mythology 
repeats myth at a higher potency or intensity. Such is the process of potentiation 
which structures all of reality. What is continually repeats itself in more intense 
forms. Hence, Schelling writes in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology 
themselves, 
 
The potencies pass through all the positions and relations to each other which 
they had in the process of nature… The mythological process passes, 
according to the same law, through the same level through which nature 
originally passed. [These are] the principles of all being and all becoming... 
 16 
the universal process that repeats itself... The process that repeats itself in 
[myth], only in a particular way, is the universal and absolute process.
38
 
 
The same series of potencies which recur in everything recur both in myth and 
philosophy. In general, philosophy is repetition with a difference, where such 
difference is not at all to be understood as qualitative; it is not a difference of 
translation or appropriation. Rather, the difference is one of intensity and quantity. 
This latter claim refers us back to Schelling’s metaphysics as a whole. To 
quote two key claims from his earlier writings, 
 
[Reality consists in] a single fundamental pattern repeated with continual 
quantitative variations.
39
 
 
Philosophy will repeat and bring to light in infinite forms and shapes only the 
one, the absolute.
40
 
 
That is, one essence always repeats itself in different forms; however, what is key is 
that these forms are qualitatively identical as well. The only distinction in the forms is 
quantitative, a difference of intensity or potency. Hence, in his canonical presentation 
of quantitative differentiation in the 1801 Presentation, Schelling insists, “None other 
than quantitative difference is at all possible between subject and predicate.” Thus, it 
follows, first, that “any qualitative difference between the two is unthinkable” and, 
second, that the only difference possible is “in respect to the amount of being”41 or, 
                                                 
38
 Schelling, Werke, 11:216; Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, 150. 
39
 Schelling, Werke, 5:341; On University Studies, ed. Nobert Guterman and trans. E.S. Morgan 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), 140. 
40
 F.W.J. Schelling, Briefe und Dokumente, ed. Horst Fuhrmans (Bonn: Grundmann, 1962), vol. 2, 326. 
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what Schelling elsewhere calls, “different grades of identity”42. There are no 
qualitative differences between forms and none between content; all that alters is the 
various “amounts” of form.43 I am here implying that we must take Schelling’s 
doctrine of quantitative differentiation far more seriously than it has heretofore been 
taken, particularly with respect to his later philosophy. Even into the 1840s, in the 
negative philosophy especially, Schelling retains many of the basic philosophical 
tenets he had first set out in his 1801 Presentation of My System of Philosophy; 
indeed, he continually refers to this text in the later work precisely as a foundational 
source of metaphysical doctrine.
44
 
In sum, the relation between potencies in the Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Mythology is a quantitative one, in which forms are continually repeated at higher 
potencies. Thus, the relation of not only myth but also philosophy to its interpretations 
must exemplify quantitative differentiation, for this is a metaphysical structure that 
occurs universally in the Schellingian cosmos. Such, then, is Schellingian tautegory: 
readings do not alter or translate the original; they repeat the original in a qualitatively 
identical manner – both in terms of content and in terms of form. The only difference 
is that they repeat the original more intensely. The form is quantitatively superior, but 
not qualitatively different, and, as such, tautegorical reading is founded on the 
inviolability of form and, consequently, a practice of absolute literalism. 
 
 
7. 
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I have argued that the task of a philosophy of mythology is the literal repetition of 
myths, since all philosophical readings (as well as readings in the history of 
philosophy) from a Schellingian perspective must compulsively repeat to the letter. 
Tautegory leads directly to literalism. Such a reading strategy is opposed to all forms 
of allegory that forever attempt to retranslate, reform or reinterpret what is read. The 
most pervasive forms of allegory in philosophical readings are threefold, I contend.  
First, there are those readings that concentrate on metaphor or the unsaid in 
order to extract from a text what is precisely not explicitly presented there. Tautegory 
puts paid to this endeavour to interpret a text through its figurative remainders. To put 
it bluntly, Schelling here rejects Goudeli’s reading of him. The tautegorical 
imperative requires repetition of content and form; it requires attention to what is on 
the page, and that alone.  
Secondly, the Schellingian ideal of tautegory challenges any philosophical 
interpretation which attempts to translate or update a philosophy into a new 
discourse. All transposition of philosophy into new forms is unSchellingian (which is 
not to say, of course, that it is necessarily bad philosophy). The ideal of tautegory 
prohibits the interpreter from updating past philosophies. Such practices are 
allegorical, ultimately Hegelian. In short, Schelling’s comments about tautegory show 
up the Hegelian bias of vast swathes of philosophical interpretation: allegory remains 
the basic model for the history of philosophy, for it tends to place emphasis on the 
contemporary relevance of the content. 
Thirdly, tautegory can be read as a critique of hermeneutics (at least insofar as 
hermeneutics names a reading practice). There is no room for Gadamer’s dictum, “We 
understand in a different way, if we understand at all”, if “different” is here to be 
understood in anything but a purely quantitative manner. For example, any appeal to 
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two horizons in interpretation – the past and the present – through the interplay of 
which a new meaning emerges is disguised allegory, on this reading. It does not 
respect the basic principle of tautegory: the necessity and so inviolability of the 
original form. A philosophy without allegory is a philosophy of absolute literalism – 
no paraphrase, no translation – just repetition. Just as religious fundamentalists can 
only go on repeating the original words of a text, so too a Schellingian fundamentalist. 
A very different account of the concepts of difference and repetition emerge here, 
then, from those typically found in hermeneutic philosophies. Differences are merely 
differences in potency; forms and content remain qualitatively identical throughout. 
 
 
8. 
Of Pierre Menard, Borges wrote, “Menard (perhaps without wanting to) has enriched, 
by means of a new technique, the halting and rudimentary art of reading”45, and he 
does so through unwavering fidelity to the form of Cervantes’ novel. According to 
Borges, Menard “did not want to compose another Quixote – which is easy – but the 
Quixote itself… His admirable intention was to produce a few pages which would 
coincide – word for word and line for line – with those of Miguel de Cervantes.”46 
And it becomes clear as Pierre Menard continues, that such absolute literalism is not 
redundant, but potentiates Cervantes’ original: “Cervantes’ text and Menard’s are 
verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer.”47 Menard’s new “art of 
reading” can stand, then, as the very paradigm for tautegorical reading: it affirms the 
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necessity of form against esotericism and allegorising of all types, while 
simultaneously still potentiating the text. 
 Iain Hamilton Grant’s reading of Schelling is more Menardian than most. 
When Grant preserves the scandal of Schellingian Naturphilosophie against those 
solely focused on the figural remainders or contemporary reinscription of Schelling’s 
texts – when, that is, he takes Schelling at his word – he is closely conforming to the 
tautegorical ideal of reading. Hence, the explanatory priority that nature assumes in 
his interpretation does not implicitly lead to an esotericism where nature ends up 
being the perennial secret truth to any and every philosophical claim. Grant does not 
end up assuming that Schelling “speak[s] of gods where [he is] only thinking of 
natural forces” (as Schelling himself says of allegorical interpreters of myths48). 
Rather, for a Schelling taken at his word – a naturphilosophische Schelling – myths of 
the gods are not allegories of nature, but natural artefacts in their own right, requiring 
no reduction to a more basic natural potency or translation into the discourse of the 
natural sciences. Mythic and philosophical texts are part of nature too. Therefore, the 
non-textual status of nature (or even the gods of mythology) does not somehow 
interrupt literal reading practices, nor equally does literalism problematize 
Naturphilosophie. This is because Schelling’s naturalism is maximal in the sense in 
which I outlined in the opening to this essay: everything is nature, therefore nothing 
need be excluded, or even reduced or translated into something “more fundamentally” 
natural. Here we glimpse, in conclusion, the convergence of the scandal of 
Naturphilosophie with Schelling’s Menardian reading practice: a maximal 
Naturphilosophie is tautegorical without exception, and so the Naturphilosoph of a 
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maximal system must incessantly read according to the letter, compulsively repeating 
forms. 
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